A note on prediction and deduction

Philosophy of Science 28 (2):204-208 (1961)
This paper argues against the deductive reconstruction of scientific prediction, that is, against the view that in prediction the predicted event follows deductively from the laws and initial conditions that are the basis of the prediction. The major argument of the paper is intended to show that the deductive reconstruction is an inaccurate reconstruction of actual scientific procedure. Our reason for maintaining that it is inaccurate is that if the deductive reconstruction were an accurate reconstruction, then scientific prediction would be impossible
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Citations of this work BETA
Christopher H. Eliot (2011). Hempel's Provisos and Ceteris Paribus Clauses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):207-218.
J. Alberto Coffa (1976). Reply to Harnatt. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 7 (2):357-358.
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