David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:201-234 (2011)
Cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gas emissions are an important part of the climate change policies of the EU, Japan, New Zealand, among others, as well as China (soon). However, concerns have been raised on a variety of ethical grounds about the use of markets to reduce emissions. In this paper we examine three types of concern. The first holds that emissions trading schemes are 'unethical'. We examine five ethical objections. These objections hold that emissions trading is unethical because it: involves owning what should not be owned (objection 1), involves alienating responsibilities that should not be alienated (objection 2), necessarily worsens the condition of the vulnerable (objection 3), puts a price on the natural world (objection 4), and converts what ought to be a 'fine' into a 'fee' (objection 5). We find all five ethical objections unpersuasive. We then turn to consider a second kind of objection - namely that emissions trading schemes involve an unjust distribution of burdens and benefits. Finally, we consider the arguments adduced by those who question the effectiveness of emissions trading in reducing emissions. We conclude that only the objections based on distributional justice can be sustained. This points to reform of the carbon market system, rather than its elimination.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Simon Caney (2005). Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford University Press.
Tony Honoré (1987). Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and Philosophical. Oxford University Press.
Keith Hyams (2009). A Just Response to Climate Change: Personal Carbon Allowances and the Normal-Functioning Approach. Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (2):237-256.
Niccolò Machiavelli (1970). The Discourses. [Harmondsworth, Eng.]Penguin Books.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robyn Eckersley (2010). The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures. Ethics and International Affairs 24 (4):367-393.
Martin Freedman & A. J. Stagliano (2007). Accountability and Emissions Allowance Trading. Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 18:312-313.
David Wheeler, Moving Toward a Consensus on Climate Policy: The Essential Role of Global Public Disclosure.
Jennifer Moore (1990). What is Really Unethical About Insider Trading? Journal of Business Ethics 9 (3):171 - 182.
Stephen J. DeCanio (1992). Carbon Rights and Economic Development. Critical Review 6 (2-3):389-410.
Jaakko Kuosmanen (2013). What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Trading Refugee Quotas? Res Publica 19 (2):103-119.
Patricia H. Werhane (1991). The Indefensibility of Insider Trading. Journal of Business Ethics 10 (9):729 - 731.
Aaron Maltais (2013). Radically Non-Ideal Climate Politics and the Obligation to at Least Vote Green. Environmental Values 22 (5):589-608.
Deryl W. Martin & Jeffrey H. Peterson (1991). Insider Trading Revisited. Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1):57 - 61.
Jason Kawall (2011). Future Harms and Current Offspring. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (1):23-26.
Yulong Ma & Huey-Lian Sun (1998). Where Should the Line Be Drawn on Insider Trading Ethics? Journal of Business Ethics 17 (1):67-75.
Monica Aufrecht (2011). Climate Change and Structural Emissions. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):201-213.
Added to index2011-10-19
Total downloads46 ( #43,806 of 1,679,344 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #25,989 of 1,679,344 )
How can I increase my downloads?