David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 173 (2):127 - 152 (2010)
An alleged counterexample to causal decision theory, put forward by Andy Egan, is studied in some detail. It is argued that Egan rejects the evaluation of causal decision theory on the basis of a description of the decision situation that is different from—indeed inconsistent with—the description on which causal decision theory makes its evaluation. So the example is not a counterexample to causal decision theory. Nevertheless, the example shows that causal decision theory can recommend unratifiable acts (acts that once decided upon appear sub-optimal) which presents a problem in the dynamics of intentions (as a decision is the forming of an intention to act). It is argued that we can defuse this problem if we hold that decision theory is a theory of rational decision making rather than a theory of rational acts. It is shown how decisions can have epistemic side-effects that are not mediated by the act and that there are cases where one can only bring oneself to perform the best act by updating by imaging rather than by conditioning . This provides a pragmatic argument for updating by imaging rather than by conditioning in these cases.
|Keywords||Causal decision theory Counter example Imaging|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Cantwell (2013). Conditionals in Causal Decision Theory. Synthese 190 (4):661-679.
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