The logic of dominance reasoning

Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):41 - 63 (2006)
The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter-factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumption of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative "I will get a better outcome if A than if B" which is taken to have the structure "(the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B)"
Keywords Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,316
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #124,942 of 1,932,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #225,622 of 1,932,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.