The Origins of Subjectivism

Journal of Moral Education 4 (3):191-200 (1975)
A pervasive and persistent subjectivist slogan concerning the nature of right action, uttered most commonly by new students of moral philosophy, is stated and its absurdity exposed. The sources of its pervasiveness and persistence are probed, and are found to lie in the confusion of an uncontroversial conceptual feature of morality with a superficially similar over-estimation of the moral status of the individual conscience. The non-primacy of the conscience is briefly demonstrated; and it is suggested that exposure of the sources of the slogan frees one from the tendency to be taken in by it
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References found in this work BETA
Julius Kovesi (1967). Moral Notions. New York, Humanities P..
P. H. Nowell-Smith (1957). Ethics. New York, Philosophical Library.
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