A liberal egalitarian paradox

Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408 (2006)
A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. Moreover, we demonstrate how libertarianism may be justified in this framework if we drop the egalitarian condition
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267106001039
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Shlomi Segall (2012). Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):507 - 519.

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