Graduate studies at Western
Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):393-408 (2006)
|Abstract||A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. Moreover, we demonstrate how libertarianism may be justified in this framework if we drop the egalitarian condition|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Colin M. Macleod (1997). Liberal Neutrality or Liberal Tolerance? Law and Philosophy 16 (5):529 - 559.
Bertil Tungodden (2000). Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option? Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):229-245.
Dani Filc (2007). The Liberal Grounding of the Right to Health Care: An Egalitarian Critique. Theoria 54 (112):51-72.
Bertil Tungodden (2003). The Value of Equality. Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):1-44.
A. W. Cappelen (2005). Responsibility in Health Care: A Liberal Egalitarian Approach. Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (8):476-480.
Mathias Risse (2001). What to Make of the Liberal Paradox? Theory and Decision 50 (2):169-196.
Alexander W. Cappelen & Bertil Tungodden (2006). Relocating the Responsibility Cut: Should More Responsibility Imply Less Redistribution? Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (3):353-362.
Ryszard Legutko (1991). The Free Market in a Republic. Critical Review 5 (1):37-52.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #86,109 of 740,515 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,957 of 740,515 )
How can I increase my downloads?