Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15 (2012)
Abstract
Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful
Keywords Action  Principle of Alternative Possibilities  Ability  Moral Responsibiltiy
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References found in this work BETA
Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hanna Pickard (2013). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
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