Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15 (2012)
Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful
Keywords Action  Principle of Alternative Possibilities  Ability  Moral Responsibiltiy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Hanna Pickard (2015). Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

114 ( #25,380 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #84,767 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.