Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise
Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15 (2012)
| Abstract | Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful | |||||||||
| Keywords | Action Principle of Alternative Possibilities Ability Moral Responsibiltiy | |||||||||
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