Defending musical perdurantism

British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (1):59-69 (2006)
If musical works are abstract objects, which cannot enter into causal relations, then how can we refer to musical works or know anything about them? Worse, how can any of our musical experiences be experiences of musical works? It would be nice to be able to sidestep these questions altogether. One way to do that would be to take musical works to be concrete objects. In this paper, we defend a theory according to which musical works are concrete objects. In particular, the theory that we defend takes musical works to be fusions of performances. We defend this view from a series of objections, the first two of which are raised by Julian Dodd in a recent paper and the last of which is suggested by some comments of his in an earlier paper.
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DOI 10.1093/aesthj/ayj004
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Nikk Effingham (2010). The Metaphysics of Groups. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):251 - 267.

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