Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208 (2011)
|Abstract||Three plausible views—Presentism, Truthmaking, and Independence—form an inconsistent triad. By Presentism, all being is present being. By Truthmaking, all truth supervenes on, and is explained in terms of, being. By Independence, some past truths do not supervene on, or are not explained in terms of, present being. We survey and assess some responses to this.|
|Keywords||presentism truthmaking tense|
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