Philosophy without Intuitions

Oxford University Press (2012)
Abstract
The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy
Keywords Methodology  Intuition  Evidence
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Call number BD241.C335 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199644865   0199644861   9780198703020
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