Quotation and Demonstration

Philosophical Studies 111 (1):69-80 (2002)
In "Demonstratives or Demonstrations", Marga Reimer argues that quotation marks are demonstrations and that expressions enclosed with them are demonstratives. In this paper, I argue against her view. There are two objections. The first objection is that Reimer''s view has unattractive consequences: there is more ambiguity, there are more demonstratives, and there are more English expressions than we thought. The second objection is that, unlike other ambiguous expressions, some expressions that are ambiguous on Reimer''s view can''t be disambiguated by using subscripts. This suggests that, contrary to her view, those expressions aren't really ambiguous.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/4321306
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,822
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Stefano Predelli (2008). The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):555-572.
Paul Saka (2013). Quotation. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):935-949.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

170 ( #8,806 of 1,724,733 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

146 ( #1,817 of 1,724,733 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.