David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 21 (1):50–73 (2006)
Reading these excellent commentaries we already wish we had written another book—a more comprehensive, clearer, and better defended one than what we have. We are, however, quite fond of the book we ended up with, and so we’ve decided that, rather than to yield, we’ll clarify. These contributions have helped us do that, and for that we are grateful to our critics. We’re lucky in that many (so far about twenty)1 extremely able philosophers have read and commented on our work in print. A slightly discouraging fact is that all these commentators seem to think we are completely, utterly mistaken. On the positive side: Our critics seem to disagree about what we’re completely wrong about. On the one hand, radical contextualists (e.g. Travis) find our objections against them off the mark, but our objections to moderate contextualism dead-on. On the other hand, the moderate contextualists (e.g. Szabo) think that our objections against them fail, but our objections to radical contextualism are strong (Szabo, concludes that we ‘present strong arguments against radical contextualism, but only a weak case against moderate contextualism’). This means we’ve got our work cut out for us—defending the middle ground from every which way— something we are more than pleased to do. We start with general points of clarification, points it will be useful to reference from time to time when discussing each commentary. (General Comment #4 is the most important, and we will make reference to it repeatedly in what follows.).
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References found in this work BETA
François Recanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Herman Cappelen (2005). Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Blackwell Pub..
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
R. Carston (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2006). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):469–492.
Steven Gross (2008). Sincerely Saying What You Don't Believe Again. Dialectica 62 (3):349-354.
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