The Dependence of Truth on Being: Is There a Problem for Minimalism?

In Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder & Alex Steinberg (eds.), Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence. Basic Philosophical Concepts Series,. Philosophia Verlag. 297-324 (2013)
Abstract
Abstract. The aim of this paper is first to defend the intuition that truth is grounded in how things are and, second, to argue that this fact is consistent with Minimalism. After having cashed out that intuition in terms of explanatory claims of the form ‘if it is true that p, it is true that p because p’, I set out an argument against Minimalism which is based on the same intuition, and I argue that a strategy the minimalist could adopt to resist the argument, i.e. to deny the correctness of the intuition, is flawed. Then I explain why the intuition is correct and I make some claims concerning the kind of explanations which are involved in it. Now the stage is set up to present the right way for the minimalist to resist the argument. I finally answer some objections.
Keywords philosophy of language  metaphysics  truth  grounding
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