Philosophia 34 (3):253-266 (2006)
|Abstract||I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a functionalist. His functionalism should instead be given a materialistic interpretation, since he holds that only the appropriate sort of matter can realize the human psyche. Aristotle’s functionalism is therefore best viewed as a “causal functionalism,” in which functional descriptions enable us to find the right sort of material embodiment. By sidestepping dualistic assumptions, Aristotle also avoids having to deal with any further notion of consciousness|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Heinaman (2007). Actuality, Potentiality and "De Anima II.5". Phronesis 52 (2):139 - 187.
William E. Seager (1983). Functionalism, Qualia and Causation. Mind 92 (April):174-88.
William Jaworski (2004). Hylomorphism and the Mind-Body Problem. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192.
Corinne Painter (2004). Aristotle and Functionalism. Epoché 9 (1):53-77.
Eric LaRock (2002). Against the Functionalist Reading of Aristotle's Philosophy of Perception and Emotion. International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):231-258.
H. Jacoby (1990). Empirical Functionalism and Conceivability Arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.
Rita Manning (1985). Materialism, Dualism and Functionalism in Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind. Apeiron 19 (1):11 - 23.
Frans A. J. de Haas & Jaap Mansfeld (eds.) (2004). Aristotle on Generation and Corruption, Book 1: Symposium Aristotelicum. Clarendon.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #30,732 of 722,864 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,864 )
How can I increase my downloads?