An unstable eliminativism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):1–17 (2005)
In his book Objects and Persons, Trenton Merricks has reoriented and fine-tuned an argument from the philosophy of mind to support a selective eliminativism about macroscopic objects.1 The argument turns on a rejection of systematic causal overdetermination and the conviction that microscopic things do the causal work that is attributed to a great many (though not all) macroscopic things. We will argue that Merricks’ argument fails to establish his selective eliminativism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00211.x
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Jeff Engelhardt (2014). Married Causes. Acta Analytica 29 (2):161-180.

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