Broome's argument against value incomparability
Utilitas 16 (2):220-224 (2004)
| Abstract | John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing. Correspondence:c1 Erik.Carlson@filosofi.uu.se. | |||||||||
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John Broome (1997). Reasons and Motivation: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
Martijn Boot (2009). Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justified Choice. Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
Niko Kolodny (2007). State or Process Requirements? Mind 116 (462):371-385.
Peter Vallentyne (2009). Broome on Moral Goodness and Population Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):739-746.
Brad Hooker (2005). Fairness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):329 - 352.
Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Introduction, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press.
John Broome (1997). Is Incommensurability Vaguness? In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (2005). Transitivity and Vagueness. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):109-131.
Nicolas Espinoza (2008). The Small Improvement Argument. Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.
Cristian Constantinescu (2012). Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
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