Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment

Theory and Decision 54 (4):357-374 (2003)
Abstract
On occasion, in multilateral negotiations, interested parties make unilateral demands. Certain agreements need unanimity. However, a lesser degree of consensus may be feasible. In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process
Keywords Demands  Multilateral bargaining  Quota games  Strategic demand commitment
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