Character and moral choice in the cultivation of virtue

Philosophy 78 (2):219-232 (2003)
It is central to virtue ethics both that morally sound action follows from virtuous character, and that virtuous character is itself the product of habitual right judgement and choice: that, in short, we choose our moral characters. However, any such view may appear to encounter difficulty in those cases of moral conflict where an agent cannot simultaneously act (say) both honestly and sympathetically, and in which the choices of agents seem to favour the construction of different moral characters. This paper argues, against possible counter-arguments, for a view of virtue ethics which embraces the diversity of moral character.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819103000251
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,822
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
David Carr (2015). Is Gratitude a Moral Virtue? Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1475-1484.
Thalia Arawi & Philip Rosoff (2012). Competing Duties. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9 (2):135-147.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

59 ( #55,938 of 1,724,745 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #134,580 of 1,724,745 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.