Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena

In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 61-85 (2001)
Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an
Keywords Consciousness  Explanation  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Qualia  Reduction
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007116
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

98 ( #26,520 of 1,725,584 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #167,236 of 1,725,584 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.