David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3):204-209 (1975)
Immediate experiences may be found good or bad at the time of occurrence, and this value contributes to the goodness or badness of life in general. In addition, they may continue to affect later experiences to the very end of a lifetime. The final assessment of an experience, therefore, cannot be made until a lifetime has come to an end, at which point one would no longer be in a position to assess. It remains instructive, nevertheless, to apply the standard of an entire lifetime in qualifying the value assessed to any part of that lifetime. Presumably, then, the phrase “a life found good in the living of it,” refers not to a life as it is found in the moments of living it, but to a life as it appears from the vantage point of any moment while looking back over the whole. The finding seems more like finding through reflection or in imagination, than finding yellowness; and the word “living”, therefore, must be used in an unusual and uncommon sense. A life found good in the living of it, is a life which may later have value-qualities attached to it which are different from those which it was originally found to have. A life is lived and re-lived
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