Graduate studies at Western
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265 (2004)
|Abstract||Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson''s claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling. On the first conception of teleology, consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, which allows them to deflect this criticism. On the second account of teleology, even assuming that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson''s argument does not necessarily defeat such views.|
|Keywords||consequentialism extrinsic value intrinsic value maximization value|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Don Adams (2009). Aquinas and Modern Contractualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):509 – 530.
M. Reicher (ed.) (2009). States of Affairs. ontos verlag.
Thomas Hurka (2006). A Kantian Theory of Welfare? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130 (3):603 - 617.
Holger Leerhoff (2008). Bradley's Regress, Russell's States of Affairs, and Some General Remarks on the Problem. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):249-264.
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2010). Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden's Theory of States of Affairs. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):63-80.
James D. Rissler (2006). Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):193 – 209.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Truth Breakers. Topoi 29 (2):153-163.
Hans Kraml (1998). States of Affairs. Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):311-324.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #101,269 of 739,406 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,406 )
How can I increase my downloads?