David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476 (1998)
Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, by arguing that the only real alternative is eliminativism about conscious propositional thinking. Following some introductory remarks, I shall state the argument for this conclusion, and show how that conclusion can be true. Thereafter I shall defend each of the three main premises in turn
|Keywords||Elimination Language Mind Proposition Thinking|
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Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Keith Frankish (2011). Reasoning, Argumentation, and Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):79-80.
Toby M. Pearce (2003). Review. [REVIEW] Ratio 16 (2):198–203.
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