David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Environmental Values 10 (4):429–454 (2001)
It appears to have been established that it is not possible for us to harm distant future generations by failing to adopt long-range welfare policies which would conserve resources or limit pollution. By exploring a number of possible worlds, the present article shows, first, that the argument appears to be at least as telling against Aristotelian, rights-based and Rawlsian approaches as it seems to be against utilitarianism, but second, and most importantly, that it only holds if we fail to view moral agents as individuals. The article also concludes that the argument has profoundly counter-intuitive implications
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Simon Caney (2006). Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History. Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (3):464–482.
Kristian Skagen Ekeli (2005). Giving a Voice to Posterity – Deliberative Democracy and Representation of Future People. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 (5):429-450.
Robert Huseby (2008). Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor. Res Publica 14 (1):1-18.
John O'Dea (2007). The Value in Equal Opportunity: Reply to Kershnar. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):177–187.
By Alan Carter (2003). Morality and Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):161–180.
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