Can we harm future people?

Environmental Values 10 (4):429–454 (2001)
It appears to have been established that it is not possible for us to harm distant future generations by failing to adopt long-range welfare policies which would conserve resources or limit pollution. By exploring a number of possible worlds, the present article shows, first, that the argument appears to be at least as telling against Aristotelian, rights-based and Rawlsian approaches as it seems to be against utilitarianism, but second, and most importantly, that it only holds if we fail to view moral agents as individuals. The article also concludes that the argument has profoundly counter-intuitive implications
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DOI 10.2307/30301838
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John O'Dea (2007). The Value in Equal Opportunity: Reply to Kershnar. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):177–187.
By Alan Carter (2003). Morality and Freedom. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):161–180.

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