Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision

Erkenntnis (1):1-18 (2013)
I investigate the implication of the truth-relativist’s alleged ‘faultless disagreements’ for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of disagreement the truth-relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-relativist has actually preserved
Keywords relativism  disagreement  doxastic revision
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9450-7
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PhilPapers Archive J. Adam Carter, Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision
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