Online research in philosophy

George Dickie argues that Hume's principles of taste have value-laden properties as their subjects, including those properties we now refer to as ‘aesthetic’. I counter that Hume's principles have value-neutral properties as their subjects, and so exclude those properties we now refer to as ‘aesthetic’. Dickie also argues that Hume's essay on taste provides ‘the conceptual means for recognizing the problem of the interaction of aesthetic properties with other properties of artworks’. I counter that the very passages Dickie takes to provide these conceptual means in fact suggest that Hume recognizes no such problem.

l Carroll's criticisms of my essay on C. I. Lewis's conception of aesthetic experience, I discuss reasons given in support of axiological accounts of aesthetic experience, including Lewis's contentions about the intrinsic valence of all experiences and his emphasis on the interests motivating philosophical classifications of experience. I also respond to Carroll's remarks about a possible explanatory requirement on a conception of aesthetic experience and the idea that artists have aesthetic experiences as they make a work of art.

This book serves as a valuable primer to aesthetics, as well as a summary and extension of Dickie's contribution to the field.

l Carroll has recently replied to criticisms of his views about moderate moralism and aesthetic experience. This paper responds to the replies directed at me. Regarding moderate moralism, I suggest that far from being a critic, my proposals should be seen as friendly clarifications of that view. Regarding aesthetic experience, there are sharp differences between us. Here I defuse new criticisms Carroll directs at my conception of such experience, and attempt to demonstrate the implausibility of Carroll's concept-oriented conception.