Explicature and semantics

A standard view of the semantics of natural language sentences or utterances is that a sentence has a particular logical structure and is assigned truth-conditional content on the basis of that structure. Such a semantics is assumed to be able to capture the logical properties of sentences, including necessary truth, contradiction and valid inference; our knowledge of these properties is taken to be part of our semantic competence as native speakers of the language. The following examples pose a problem for this view of semantics.
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Rachel Katharine Sterken (2015). Leslie on Generics. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2493-2512.

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