Online research in philosophy

This paper joins recent attempts to defend a notion of aesthetic experience. It argues that phenomenological facts and facts about aesthetic value support the Kantian notion that aesthetic experience lies between, but differs from, pleasures of the agreeable and pleasures stemming from cognitions. It then shows that accounts by Beardsley, Levinson, and Savile fail to resolve clear tensions that surface in attempting to characterize such an experience. An account of aesthetic experience—as involving experienced cognitions that are the bearers of value—is presented. The paper ends on a sceptical note as to whether aesthetic experience can be clearly delimited.

l Carroll's criticisms of my essay on C. I. Lewis's conception of aesthetic experience, I discuss reasons given in support of axiological accounts of aesthetic experience, including Lewis's contentions about the intrinsic valence of all experiences and his emphasis on the interests motivating philosophical classifications of experience. I also respond to Carroll's remarks about a possible explanatory requirement on a conception of aesthetic experience and the idea that artists have aesthetic experiences as they make a work of art.

According to what Robert Stecker dubs the “ethical-aesthetic interaction” thesis, the ethical defects of a literary work can diminish its aesthetic value. Both the thesis and the only prominent argumentative strategy employed to support it the affective response argument have been hotly debated; however, Stecker has recently argued that the failure of the ARA does not undermine the thesis, since the argument “fails to indentify the main reason [the thesis] holds, when it in fact does.” I critically examine Stecker’s objection to the familiar versions of the affective response argument and the line of support for ethical-aesthetic interaction he proposes to install in their place. I conclude that neither is compelling; however, an important insight can be salvaged from his positive proposal, and I argue that the insight does, in fact, point toward a novel defense of the thesis.

The emerging research area of neuroaesthetics has provoked a good deal of discussion. Although it seems reasonable to describe the experience of aesthetic enjoyment as a mental event, and it also seems reasonable to claim that mental states must be related to brain states, the search for specific brain states that correlate with aesthetic enjoyment is tricky, despite the many recent advances in brain-imaging technology. Correlating the aesthetic experience with specific brain states involves defining the aesthetic experience. By applying a model from the world of empirical consciousness research to three neuroaesthetic experiments, I show that each of these studies approaches the object of study, the aesthetic experience, from a different perspective. By employing a framework to make explicit the sometimes implicit assumptions involved in neuroaesthetic research, I hope to open a new avenue for the continuation of an already fascinating discussion.

Both my deflationary approach to aesthetic experience and what I call moderate moralism have been challenged recently in the pages of the British Journal of Aesthetics by Paisley Livingston, Robert Stecker, and George Dickie. In this essay, I attempt to deal with their objections while also trying to move the debate to new ground.

What is the nature of the aesthetic experience? Is it the same for everyone? It is possible to facilitate its occurrence? This book focuses on the psychology of the aesthetic experience and on the perception and understanding of art, suggesting ways to raise levels of visual literacy and enhance artistic enjoyment. The findings will be of importance not only to museum professionals and art educators, but also to psychologists and those interested in the nature of the aesthetic experience.

l Carroll has recently replied to criticisms of his views about moderate moralism and aesthetic experience. This paper responds to the replies directed at me. Regarding moderate moralism, I suggest that far from being a critic, my proposals should be seen as friendly clarifications of that view. Regarding aesthetic experience, there are sharp differences between us. Here I defuse new criticisms Carroll directs at my conception of such experience, and attempt to demonstrate the implausibility of Carroll's concept-oriented conception.