First persons: On Richard Moran's authority and estrangement

Inquiry 46 (3):395 – 408 (2003)
Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is wide-ranging and compelling, he relies throughout on an overly intellectualized conception of first-person attitudes as attitudes of reflection or deliberation. That conception is at once implausible and unnecessary to the main current of his argument, whose goal is to demonstrate that our self-conception as persons depends on both the distinctness and the interconnectedness of our first- and third-person perspectives on ourselves.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201740310002424
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Barry Stroud (2000). Practical Reasoning. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Reasoning Practically. Oxford University Press

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Julie Germein (2012). Two Objections to Moran's Transparency Account. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

58 ( #57,681 of 1,725,873 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #166,949 of 1,725,873 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.