Free will and intentional action

Philosophia 16 (December):355-364 (1986)
I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
Keywords Action  Ethics  Free Will  Intentional  Rationality  Responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379753
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