Philosophia 16 (December):355-364 (1986)
|Abstract||I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.|
|Keywords||Action Ethics Free Will Intentional Rationality Responsibility|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
Robert Audi (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Cornell University Press.
Ryan Wasserman (2011). Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.
Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Libertarianism, Luck, and Action Explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:321-340.
Frank Hindriks (2011). Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Alfred R. Mele (2002). Autonomy and Akrasia. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.
Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads29 ( #43,119 of 556,788 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,788 )
How can I increase my downloads?