David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins (2004)
Following a short introduction, this chapter begins by contrasting two different forms of higher-order perception (HOP) theory of phenomenal consciousness - inner sense theory versus a dispositionalist kind of higher-order thought (HOT) theory - and by giving a brief statement of the superiority of the latter. Thereafter the chapter considers arguments in support of HOP theories in general. It develops two parallel objections against both first-order representationalist (FOR) theories and actualist forms of HOT theory. First, neither can give an adequate account of the distinctive features of our recognitional concepts of experience. And second, neither can explain why there are some states of the relevant kinds that are phenomenal and some that aren.
|Keywords||Consciousness Higher-order Theory Perception Representation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Benjamin Kozuch (2014). Prefrontal Lesion Evidence Against Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
Similar books and articles
Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-Order Consciousness and Phenomenal Space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).
Uriah Kriegel (2006). The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 143--170.
Jennifer Matey (2011). Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.
William G. Lycan (2004). The Superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. 93â114.
Rebecca Copenhaver (2007). Reid on Consciousness: Hop, Hot or For? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):613-634.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.
Ben Phillips (2014). Indirect Representation and the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
Angela Coventry & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Locke on Consciousness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):221-242.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads91 ( #13,633 of 1,102,700 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #6,401 of 1,102,700 )
How can I increase my downloads?