Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal

Acta Analytica 26 (3):285-293 (2011)
Abstract
Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal
Keywords Epistemic value  Truth  Value of truth  Omniscience  Epistemic normativity
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Pointless Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.
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Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Pointless Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):199-212.
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