Mentalism, information, and consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):333-333 (2002)
The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X02250062
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