David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 39 (4):615-635 (2011)
We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey ( 2010 ) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding , rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly
|Keywords||Assertion Norms Understanding Justification Knowledge|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Audi (1997). The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):405 - 422.
Jessica Brown (2008). The Knowledge Norm for Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Herman Cappelen (2011). Against Assertion. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Philip J. Nickel (2013). Testimonial Entitlement, Norms of Assertion and Privacy. Episteme 10 (2):207-217.
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