David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 18 (5):502-523 (2003)
This paper sketches a solution to a problem which has been emphasized by Fodor. This is the problem of how to explain distinctively-human flexible cognition in modular terms. There are three aspects to the proposed account. First, it is suggested that natural language sentences might serve to integrate the outputs of a number of conceptual modules. Second, a creative sentence-generator, or supposer, is postulated. And third, it is argued that a set of principles of inference to the best explanation can be constructed from already-extant aspects of linguistic testimony and discourse interpretation. Most importantly, it is suggested that the resulting architecture should be implementable in ways that are computationally tractable.
|Keywords||Cognition Inference Language Sentence Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (eds.) (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Axel Gelfert (2010). Reconsidering the Role of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Epistemology of Testimony. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):386-396.
Murray Shanahan & Bernard J. Baars (2005). Applying Global Workspace Theory to the Frame Problem. Cognition 98 (2):157-176.
Axel Gelfert (2011). Steps to an Ecology of Knowledge: Continuity and Change in the Genealogy of Knowledge. Episteme 8 (1):67-82.
Bradley Rives (2009). Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211 - 238.
Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels (2014). Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.
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