Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):549 – 560 (2003)
|Abstract||Russell famously argued that Resemblance Nominalism leads to a vicious infinite regress in attempting to avoid admitting universals. Saying that a number of things are white only in that they resemble a particular white thing leaves a number of resemblances to that white thing, each of them constituting the holding of the same relation to the paradigm, qualifying that resemblance relation as a universal. Trying to dismiss that new universal by appeal to resemblances between those first resemblances only leads to a new universal of resemblance, and so on. It is argued here that this does not arise for a properly formulated resemblance theory, which only requires one complex relation among the many particulars we deal with, a complex relation which is not multiply instantiated and thus not a universal.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alexander Paseau (2012). Resemblance Theories of Properties. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):361-382.
Sophie Gibb (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? Dialectica 61 (4):539-558.
Matteo Morganti (2007). Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism? Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.
Charles Landesman (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York,Basic Books.
Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #17,747 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,222 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?