On realism in set theory

Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1):3-17 (1996)
In her recent book, Realism in mathematics, Penelope Maddy attempts to reconcile a naturalistic epistemology with realism about set theory. The key to this reconciliation is an analogy between mathematics and the physical sciences based on the claim that we perceive the objects of set theory. In this paper I try to show that neither this claim nor the analogy can be sustained. But even if the claim that we perceive some sets is granted, I argue that Maddy's account fails to explain the key issue faced by an epistemology for mathematics, namely the step from knowledge of the finite to knowledge of the infinite.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/philmat/4.1.3
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,209
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

36 ( #131,180 of 1,940,986 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #333,940 of 1,940,986 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.