On the ontological commitment of mereology

Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):164-174 (2009)
In Parts of Classes (1991) and Mathematics Is Megethology (1993) David Lewis defends both the innocence of plural quantification and of mereology. However, he himself claims that the innocence of mereology is different from that of plural reference, where reference to some objects does not require the existence of a single entity picking them out as a whole. In the case of plural quantification . Instead, in the mereological case: (Lewis, 1991, p. 87). The aim of the paper is to argue that one—an innocence thesis similar to that of plural reference is defensible. To give a precise account of plural reference, we use the idea of plural choice. We then propose a virtual theory of mereology in which the role of individuals is played by plural choices of atoms
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020309090157
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George Boolos (1985). Nominalist Platonism. Philosophical Review 94 (3):327-344.
David Lewis (1993). Mathematics in Megethology. Philosophia Mathematica 1 (1):3-23.

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