David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (2000)
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$13.60 used (84% off) $67.23 new (19% off) $74.70 direct from Amazon (10% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B808.9.C37 2000|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Declan Smithies (2013). The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Philip Goff (2012). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
Similar books and articles
William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema 28:167-80.
Peter Carruthers (2003). Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
Mark Rowlands (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering Without Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
M. Moskopp Kurthen (1995). On the Prospects of a Naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. 107--122.
Diana I. Pérez (2008). Why Should Our Mind-Reading Abilities Be Involved in the Explanation of Phenomenal Consciousness? Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):35-84.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1).
Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads74 ( #18,430 of 1,100,870 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #58,660 of 1,100,870 )
How can I increase my downloads?