Practical reasoning in a modular mind

Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278 (2004)
  This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any significant retreat from a thesis of massively modular mental organization
Keywords Metaphysics  Mind  Modular  Practical Reason  Reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00258.x
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Carruthers (2003). On Fodor's Problem. Mind and Language 18 (5):502-523.

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