Review: Simulation and the First-Person [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):467 - 475 (2009)
Abstract
This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves.
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