Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory

In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press 22--38 (1996)
In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
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Erica Cosentino (2011). Self in Time and Language. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):777-783.

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