Sympathy and subjectivity

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82 (1999)
Abstract
This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological
Keywords Consciousness  Ethics  Metaphysics  Subjectivity  Sympathy
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Peter Carruthers (2004). Suffering Without Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.
Ned Block (2007). Overflow, Access, and Attention. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):530-548.
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