Some comments on fatalism

Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11 (1996)
This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here
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DOI 10.2307/2956301
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