Graduate studies at Western
In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press (2005)
|Abstract||One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to be pain. This assumption, which I call the Cartesian assumption, can be seen everywhere from the standard arguments against physicalism—such as those advanced by Kripke, Nagel, and Levine—to current theorizing about consciousness. I here argue that this assumption is false and that it goes wrong in two ways. I further argue that the appeal of the Cartesian assumption is due to a commitment many still have to a poorly motivated and misguided Cartesian model of consciousness and its relation to mental states. As an alternative to this Cartesian concept of mind, I argue for a theory of consciousness which claims that the “phenomenal character” of a sensation or perception—the “what it’s like” to have that sensation—is determined by the content of a higher-order thought one has of that sensory state.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
Kevin Connolly, Craig French, David M. Gray & Adrienne Prettyman, The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration: Conference Report.
Itay Shani (2007). Consciousness and the First Person. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):57-91.
Myrto I. Mylopoulos (2011). Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
David M. Rosenthal (1997). A Theory of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Mit Press.
Austen Clark (2010). Color, Qualia, and Attention : A Non-Standard Interpretation. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.
Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
Added to index2010-01-10
Total downloads51 ( #24,451 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,186 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?