Suffering without subjectivity

Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125 (2004)
Abstract
  This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Subjectivity  Suffering
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-3635-5
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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