Suffering without subjectivity

Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125 (2004)
Abstract
  This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Subjectivity  Suffering
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
    Peter Carruthers (1989). Brute Experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.

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