The body in Husserl and Merleau-ponty

Philosophical Topics 27 (2):205-226 (1999)
Abstract
The terminological boxes into which we press the history of philosophy often obscure deep and important differences among major figures supposedly belonging to a single school of thought. One such disparity within the phenomenological movement, often overlooked but by no means invisible, separates Merleau-Pontys Phenomenology of Perception from the Husserlian program that initially inspired it. For Merleau-Pontys phenomenology amounts to a radical, if discreet, departure not only from Husserls theory of intentionality generally, but more specifically from his account of the intentional constitution of the body and its role in perceptual experience
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Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
Benedict Smith (2013). Depression and Motivation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):615-635.
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