|Abstract||Grice made a distinction between what is said by a speaker of a verbal utterance and what is implicated. What is implicated might be either conven- tional (that is, largely generated by the standing meaning of certain linguistic expressions, such as ‘but’ and ‘moreover’) or conversational (that is, dependent on the assumption that the speaker is following certain rational principles of conversational exchange). What appears to have bound these rather disparate aspects of utterance meaning together, and so motivated the common label of implicature, was that they did not contribute to the truthconditional content of the utterance, that is, the proposition it expressed, or what the speaker of the utterance said.|
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