David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press 35 (2011)
The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that if cognitive phenomenology is to be found anywhere, it should be found here. However, we begin with a discussion of the question of cognitive phenomenology more generally, and we close by sketching how our argument might be extended into the domain of non-perceptual thought.
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Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.
Berit Brogaard & Bartek Chomanski (2015). Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486.
Wolfgang Barz (2016). Infallibility, Acquaintance, and Phenomenal Concepts. Dialectica 70 (2):139-168.
Jordan Dodd (2014). Realism and Anti-Realism About Experiences of Understanding. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):745-767.
Peter Carruthers (2015). Perceiving Mental States. Consciousness and Cognition 36:498-507.
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