The Essential Tie Between Knowing and Believing: A Causal Account of Knowledge and Epistemic Reasons
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Edwin Mellen Press (2011)
This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Belief and doubt Skepticism, Plato, Epistemic Reasons|
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|Call number||BD215.C37 2011|
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