The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness

In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness (2002)
Abstract
All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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