The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness
In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness (2002)
| Abstract | All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not. | |||||||||
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